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1Executive Summary
Reinsurance provides insurance coverage for insur-
ance carriers. Many health plans purchase private 
reinsurance to protect themselves from unexpect-
edly large volumes of high-cost claims and for 
other business reasons. In 2001, New York began 
Healthy NY, a program of state-funded reinsur-
ance, which has grown to cover almost 150,000 
people. Healthy NY sought to attract new enroll-
ees by having health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) offer a new, streamlined and subsidized 
product for previously uninsured, low-income 
workers or their workplace groups. The state 
subsidy consists of reinsurance reimbursement to 
carriers of 90 percent of medical benefits costs in 
the “corridor” of $5,000–$70,000 in spending per 
person per year.
The Reinsurance Institute was a project that 
provided quantitative modeling and qualitative 
analytical support for states with strong interest in 
using reinsurance as an element of health cover-
age reform. A rationale was that better advance 
information could help states avoid some of the 
trial-and-error determination of impacts illus-
trated by Healthy NY’s experience. The project 
worked closely with state officials from Rhode 
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin to thoroughly 
understand state circumstances, to build a baseline 
dataset not previously available to simulate premi-
ums, and to estimate the impacts of reinsurance. 
Such impacts included changes in premiums, in 
employer offer and enrollee take-up of coverage, 
in numbers of people insured, and in costs to the 
state of reimbursing primary carriers for claims 
under the state-specified terms of reinsurance. 
Throughout the project, the team consulted with 
states on related issues of program design within 
the prevailing market and regulatory context.
Because no existing data sources linked all state 
residents and their employers or contained socio-
demographic information and medical spending by 
resident, employer characteristics, prevailing pre-
miums in the state, and generally applicable state 
insurance rate-making rules, data from existing 
national and state sources were combined in such 
a way as to create a database for each state that 
contained these elements and reflected known state 
characteristics. Estimated premiums were bench-
marked to prevailing state rates. Policy makers 
expressed considerable interest in baseline informa-
tion, even before formal modeling, as it illustrated 
two key points. First, small numbers of very high 
spenders account for a large share of health spend-
ing, but most spending nonetheless occurs in lower 
corridors of claims expense. As one example, 
almost 65 percent of Wisconsin’s insured spending 
was estimated to occur under $10,000 per year per 
person. Second, medical spending varies widely 
across individuals and by age and health status. 
This systematic variation creates pressure for risk 
segmentation across health insurance pools.
The model then estimated how much insurance 
purchases were likely to change if reinsurance 
reduced insurers’ claims costs and insurers’ reduced 
premiums to a commensurate extent. The model 
simulated the extent to which enrollees would take 
up offers of insurance, from employment groups 
or in the non-group market, as well as the extent 
to which employers would add or drop offers of 
insurance. Modeling of individual and employer 
responses to premium changes was based on elas-
ticities from economic literature. 
In specifying configurations of reinsurance to be 
modeled, all participating states sought not only 
to expand health insurance coverage, but also to 
support existing coverage. A surprise was that 
none ultimately showed much interest in adapting 
Healthy NY’s approach of targeting only previ-
ously uninsured people. Participants also wanted 
to focus help on small firms or non-group buyers 
of coverage. Many configurations of reinsurance 
were modeled—that is, different specifications of 
eligible populations, corridors, and percentages of 
costs in the corridor to be reimbursed by the state 
rather than retained by the carrier. Washington 
and Wisconsin both wanted to model the impact 
of state general funding, as in Healthy NY. Rhode 
Island wanted to use insurer assessments and rein-
surance payouts to shift funds across carriers based 
on patterns of medical spending incurred.
Based upon formal modeling, other quantitative 
estimates, and qualitative assessments, project 
findings include the following:
• Reinsurance subsidy from state general funds 
or special funds (as opposed to carrier assess-
ments) did expand coverage among the previ-
ously uninsured. Modeled configurations of 
reinsurance often achieved premium reductions 
by about one-third. How much reinsurance 
reduced premiums and hence increased cover-
age was a function of how much state funding 
was hypothesized. The amount of funding was 
much more important than the configuration of 
reinsurance; that is, whether corridors were set 
relatively lower or higher, and achieving large 
impacts required large state funding.
• Most of the impact occurred because of 
increased employer offers of coverage rather 
than increased employee take up of offers 
once made.
• Impacts of reinsurance differed somewhat by 
individual characteristics. One surprise for states 
was that reinsurance often disproportionately 
helped higher income rather than lower income 
residents—those with higher incomes remained 
more able to afford even cheaper coverage.
• Most reinsurance dollars served not to expand 
coverage but to solidify existing coverage by 
making it less likely that small employers would 
drop coverage and allowing some people with 
non-group to switch to group coverage.
• Eligibility targeting affects what share of the 
subsidy goes to newly covered individuals 
rather than already covered people.
• Reinsurance also can help ameliorate risk 
segmentation in small-group and non-
group markets in states that desire to do so. 
However, reinsurance alone will not make 
coverage available to higher risk people 
unless regulation requires that they be 
offered coverage and pools losses so as to 
create affordable premiums.
Reinsurance Institute interactions with states 
also offered some insights into technical assis-
tance processes, as discussed in the report.
An overall conclusion is that reinsurance is not 
cost-effective if intended solely to increase cover-
age, unless it follows Healthy NY and targets the 
subsidy only to the previously uninsured. However, 
participating states’ modeling requests clearly 
reflected other goals, which included solidifying 
existing coverage and addressing risk segmentation. 
Greater clarity about the importance of other goals 
is needed in order to more rigorously assess ben-
efits and costs of reinsurance.
A more complete analysis should also consider 
other mechanisms with similar goals. For insur-
ance subsidies, these include vouchers, other 
premium subsidies, and public program expan-
sion. To address risk segmentation, alternatives 
include expanded regulatory support for forms 
of community rating, risk-adjusted premium con-
tributions paid in advance, ceding of identified 
high risk people or groups in advance (prospec-
tive reinsurance), and withholds from premiums 
or pooling of assessments that are distributed at 
the end of the year according to the risks actually 
enrolled by an insurer. Many such alternatives 
call for more thoroughgoing public control or 
oversight of flows of insurance funds than does 
reinsurance. Indeed, state policymakers under 
this project frequently wanted to consider broad-
er reform issues than reinsurance and many state 
reform proposals reflect the broadening of the 
coverage expansion discussion. 
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Reinsurance in State Health 
Reform
Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.1 
Through reinsurance, some of the risk of health 
spending assumed by primary insurers is shared 
with others. Primary risk bearers include insur-
ance companies, health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), and self-insured large-employer groups. 
In the private sector, primary insurers have long 
bought reinsurance to protect themselves against 
the risk of unexpectedly high medical expenses of 
their enrollees. Part of states’ small-group insurance 
market reforms in the 1990s also included one 
form of publicly overseen but privately financed 
private reinsurance pooling.2
Interest has recently grown in using a new form 
of publicly funded reinsurance as one way to help 
maintain or expand private health insurance.3 This 
attention partly reflects greater state interest in 
health coverage reform.4 Massachusetts’ successful 
2006 enactment of a particularly ambitious reform 
has further spurred other states’ efforts.5 Interest 
in reinsurance mainly derives from its success in 
subsidizing the Healthy New York (Healthy NY) 
expansion of 2001. Healthy NY uses tobacco-
settlement funds to encourage previously unin-
sured low-income workers to enroll in HMOs.6 
Enrollment reached 147,530 Healthy NY members 
by October 2007.7 Sellers (carriers) receive substan-
tial assistance in paying for the costs of enrollees 
with large annual medical spending, while buyers 
(non-group policyholders, as well as employers and 
employees) receive an indirect premium subsidy.8
Several other states have shown interest in rein-
surance, most notably Kansas, where advanced 
health reform planning got under way in 
2000–2001, supported by a Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) State Planning 
Grant and technical assistance available from 
the State Coverage Initiatives program (SCI).9 
SCI responded to interest in this new approach 
to subsidizing coverage by creating a new mode 
of grant support to assist interested state policy-
makers—the Reinsurance Institute. That Institute 
was designed to build a population-based micro-
simulation model to estimate the benefits and 
costs of reinsurance and also to provide qualita-
tive technical assistance.10
How Reinsurance Works in 
Healthy NY and Other Programs
In private markets, health plans and self-
insured employer groups often pay reinsurers 
to assume most of the risks of very high claims. 
Reinsurance for employer groups and for 
HMOs is sometimes termed stop-loss cover-
age; Healthy NY uses that term as well. Because 
private carriers’ primary motivation for buying 
reinsurance is to protect their solvency against 
unforeseen fluctuation in losses, private rein-
surance typically covers only very high claims 
and often covers the risk of all claims up to the 
same ceiling as applicable under the primary 
carrier’s underlying coverage. Private reinsur-
ance may also serve other goals, such as allow-
ing a carrier to underwrite a higher volume of 
business than otherwise possible, enter a new 
market, or obtain specialized reinsurer exper-
tise.11 Reinsurance transactions are not visible to 
primary insurance enrollees, who deal only with 
their primary carrier.
Publicly funded reinsurance is a similar mecha-
nism, but its motivations are different.12 It seeks 
to subsidize private insurance with outside 
funds so as to lower premiums and possibly 
also to help stabilize targeted insurance markets. 
Public reinsurance has not been observed as a 
stand-alone reform. Rather, it is part of a broad-
er strategy to maintain or expand coverage.
The form of reinsurance addressed by the 
Reinsurance Institute reimburses a primary 
insurer for a designated share of individuals’ 
annual medical claims spending at year’s end. 
A specified reinsurance threshold operates as 
a kind of deductible for the primary insurer, 
and a ceiling limits the reinsurer’s obligations. 
In the “corridor” in between, the primary car-
rier remains responsible for some percentage 
of claims expense incurred. This coinsurance 
obligation or insurer “retention” is meant to 
maintain some incentive for the primary carrier 
to manage care and spending, not simply to 
dump expensive cases into the reinsurance pool. 
Above the ceiling, the primary carrier is again 
responsible for 100 percent of claims, up to 
whatever ceiling applies in the underlying policy. 
The latter feature also encourages continued 
case management by primary carriers.
For example, under Healthy NY, participating 
HMOs as primary risk bearers are responsible 
for all claims up to $5,000 for each member 
during each calendar year (Exhibit 1).13 Starting 
at $5,000 and continuing through $75,000 each 
year, the state reinsurance reimburses the health 
plans for 90 percent of their annual spending 
for any member’s cumulative claims. Above 
$75,000, the primary carriers again bear 100 per-
cent of the cost of claim. 
 
The Healthy NY reinsurance corridor of 
$5,000–$75,000 per member per year covers 
a much lower range of expenditure than does 
private reinsurance, which starts higher and may 
go to the maximum claim level covered under 
the underlying primary policy. Possibly because 
its corridor is not high, New York does not 
appear to build in high-cost case management 
strategies such as are often offered or required 
by private reinsurers.14 New York’s low-corridor 
approach is geared more to providing a reliable 
subsidy than to protecting against the highest 
claims. Given HMO-style coverage and the pre-
viously uninsured population enrolled, the risk of 
extremely high payouts may be quite low.
New York initially set its corridor at 
$30,000–$100,000 and was surprised to find that 
only a very low share of insured medical spending 
“penetrated” the per-person threshold and trig-
gered subsidy for the HMO involved. Evidently 
enrollees were unexpectedly healthy. To increase 
the amount of state subsidy and its impact on 
premiums, both the threshold and the ceiling 
were decreased by $25,000. In response, the plans 
reduced premiums by about 17 percent.15
Source: Authors’ graphic, based on Healthy NY documents.
claims/person/year
$75K+
$5K-75K
$0-5K
end-of-year, per person
primary carrier pays 100%
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corridor:
reinsurer pays 90%
primary carrier 10%
threshold
primary carrier pays 100%
Exhibit 1. Simplified Sketch: Healthy NY
3Reinsurance is only one feature of Healthy NY. 
Program eligibility specifications essentially limit 
enrollment to low-income workers uninsured 
for the previous 12 months and their small 
employers. Coverage is supplied only by HMOs, 
and their benefits are streamlined. Mental health 
services are not covered, for example, and buy-
ers may also opt to omit prescription coverage. 
Other rules come from normal state regulation 
of carriers that also applies to Healthy NY 
plans. The state limits its budgetary commit-
ment to reinsurance subsidy, but the program 
has never neared that limit. If, however, reinsur-
ance claims ever exceeded available state funds, 
the program would reduce reinsurance payouts 
pro rata to stay on budget.
The reinsurance of Healthy NY is retrospective. 
Whose claims will be covered is not known until 
year’s end. Retrospective reinsurance is also pub-
licly required for Medicaid managed care plans. 
Their reinsurance, however, is financed from a 
share of state capitation payments rather than run 
as a separate subsidy of otherwise private plans.16 
State subsidized reinsurance of private plans was 
also a feature of Healthcare Group of Arizona 
(HGA) for about five years. HGA is meant to 
be funded by businesses’ own premiums, but the 
state subsidy was begun in 1999 as one response 
to the adverse selection experienced by HGA 
plans as the program grew more popular and 
which led some plans to drop out.17 The subsidy 
was ended after 2004, and other countermeasures 
were implemented to address adverse selection.18
How the Reinsurance Institute 
Helped States
Prior SCI programs of technical assistance for 
state insurance reform helped one jurisdiction at 
a time. The Reinsurance Institute was designed to 
improve upon that format by creating a commu-
nity of state policymakers interested in reinsurance, 
then giving detailed technical assistance to three of 
those states.19 Central to the assistance was detailed 
modeling of reinsurance costs and benefits, which 
would serve to lessen the likelihood of surprises 
like those faced by Healthy NY. 
SCI convened an initial Institute meeting in 
Albany, NY, in September 2006, inviting 17 
states to participate based upon how ready they 
were to benefit from the help available. At that 
meeting, New York policymakers described 
Healthy NY and its experience. Reinsurance 
Institute staff further described reinsurance and 
other roles it might play in reform, along with 
the quantitative modeling and qualitative assis-
tance to be made available through the Institute. 
General discussion among attendees not only 
helped state staff improve their understanding 
of the issues, but also helped Institute staff bet-
ter appreciate state interests. 
Three states were later selected from among 10 
that submitted formal requests to SCI to receive 
technical assistance and modest additional fund-
ing to facilitate their participation. The states 
were Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
Institute staff worked with state officials to 
thoroughly understand state circumstances and 
policy environments and to build a microsimu-
lation model to estimate the effects of new rein-
surance subsidies on insurance. State officials 
also specified how they wanted to structure the 
reinsurance options to be modeled.
The Reinsurance Institute project thus had two 
components. First, it developed a new microsim-
ulation model tailored to estimating changes in 
insurance enrollment based on buyers’ responses 
to reinsurance-driven premium decreases. 
Second, it created a capable team for consulting 
with states on related issues of program design 
within the prevailing market and regulatory con-
text.20 The simulation modeling was designed 
to address the new reforms using retrospective 
reinsurance subsidies like those of Healthy NY. 
Modeling also provided information relevant 
to other reforms, and a number of issues were 
addressed, mainly in qualitative ways.
The Simulation Model
This project first built for each state a dataset 
that represented the insurance status and costs 
of all state residents. This baseline information 
included medical spending for each person in 
the population, simulated the distribution of 
population across employer and non-group 
insurance markets, and estimated pre-reinsur-
ance premiums. Staff also consulted with states 
about their goals as well as reinsurance con-
figurations that they wished to have modeled. 
Then the project used its simulation model to 
estimate the impact of subsidy on premiums, 
the resulting change in employers’ willingness 
to offer coverage and employees’ willingness 
to “take-up” those offers, the response of con-
sumers purchasing in non-group markets, and, 
therefore, the change in insurance coverage and 
the impact on state costs to subsidize reinsur-
ance. The project initially mapped out modeling 
components on a “generic” or national basis. 
To accomplish its goals, the model then had to 
be altered to reflect circumstances in each state. 
Model construction was complex, and considerable 
back-and-forth was needed with state clients, but 
the resulting information was policy-relevant and 
proved very useful to states. A short description of 
modeling structure and processes follows. A com-
panion report provides much more detail.21
Baseline Medical Spending and 
Insurance Premiums for Individuals 
and Firms
The model first created a baseline of informa-
tion on each state’s current population.22 This 
included socio-demographic characteristics, 
household structure, employment status, cover-
age status, per-person medical spending, and 
the insurance premiums needed to cover that 
spending. The baseline was a key strength of 
the project’s modeling, as reliable data are the 
core need for many actuarial and other insur-
ance estimations, whether used for simulation 
modeling or to give other advice to states.
 
All available databases were inadequate by 
themselves, so this project created a new one 
by combining data from multiple sources, 
drawing on the strengths of each data source. 
Insurance claims data, for example, contain 
accurate information about the nature, size, 
and distribution of covered medical spending. 
By definition, however, insurance data do not 
include the uninsured—a key focus of reform 
efforts—and are not weighted to accurately 
represent the fully insured population. They also 
lack information on household incomes, often a 
key influence on states’ willingness to contribute 
a subsidy. Moreover, claims spending data also 
omit out-of-pocket costs to enrollees, and vary 
across insurers and across coverages according 
to the population enrolled and benefits covered.
Source: Author’s graphic.
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medical
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5. 
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to state
Exhibit 2. Creating an Accurate Baseline of State Population and Premiums
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There were five key steps in baseline data con-
struction (Exhibit 2). 
1. It began with national data from the federal 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Household 
Component (MEPS-HC). This federal survey 
represents the entire non-institutionalized popu-
lation and has information not available from 
insurance claims. MEPS-HC provides detailed 
data on individuals’ medical spending by source 
of payment, insurance coverage, income, nature 
of employment (industry, firm size, hourly wage, 
hours worked, insurance offer at work), and 
health status. These are all factors that states 
might want to use in designing alternative rein-
surance plans, but the data are national rather 
than state-specific. We pooled three years’ worth 
of data to obtain a larger sample size that more 
fully reflects variation in characteristics, and we 
inflated spending to 2007 dollars.
2. The model then adjusted the reported expen-
ditures to correct for known shortcomings 
in the data. In particular, MEPS-HC data 
are incomplete as to individual demograph-
ics, and are known to understate total 
medical spending, especially for very large 
claims.23 After these first two steps, we had 
a population-based, generic, national data set 
that could be modified to correspond to the 
population characteristics of any state.
3. The next step was to re-weight these national 
data to match each of the three participat-
ing states’ known demographics. The federal 
Current Population Survey (CPS) was used for 
this weighting because it offers an ideal comple-
ment to MEPS-HC. The CPS provides large 
state-specific samples of population data that 
can be used to re-weight MEPS claims and 
spending information to resemble any state’s 
size and distribution of population by insur-
ance status, income, age, family structure, and 
employment status. CPS also has the same type 
of detailed employment information as in the 
MEPS-HC. [For Washington only, most data 
on residents’ demographics and insurance status 
came from the Washington State Population 
Survey (WSPS)24 rather than the CPS, although 
CPS data were used in one instance where the 
WSPS response rate was insufficient.]
4. The succeeding step used information on 
business composition by state to assign 
each worker and any dependents to a set of 
“synthetic” employers whose composition 
matched each state’s establishment sizes and 
industry mix.25 For Washington only, the 
generic model was also modified to focus 
on conventional small-group and non-group 
coverages, that is, to exclude people simu-
lated as being enrolled in association health 
plans or the state high-risk pool, whose risks 
of high spending are systematically different.
5. Finally, the baseline estimated the insurance 
premium faced by each person in the rel-
evant private markets. Premium levels mainly 
depend on expected health spending, the 
applicable insurance rating rules for spread-
ing risk across insurance pools (e.g., modified 
community rating, “rate bands” for small-
group coverage), and the size of any available 
workplace group. Employer size matters 
because very small groups’ premiums include 
very high administrative “loading” expense 
on top of medical claims costs, relative to 
the loads paid by larger small groups.26 Non-
group loading is even higher. Loading covers 
non-medical expenses of insurance opera-
tions, from sales to claims settlement and 
return on capital. The model’s initial premi-
um estimates were benchmarked to reported 
premiums from another state-by-state federal 
survey, this one of employers.27 The results 
were then confirmed through interviews with 
insurers and others in each state. 
The result of these five steps was a baseline of 
state-specific data of privately insured individu-
als and households, along with the uninsured 
population, that well reflected known state char-
acteristics. Unusually, the data combine demo-
graphic detail at the individual and household 
level with premium estimates made at the level 
of individuals and firms. This is the universe 
within which state initiatives might target rein-
surance intervention.
Modeling Changes from Reinsurance
Starting from this baseline for each state, the 
model next simulated the changes in patterns of 
medical claims costs and insurance coverage that 
would be caused by a new state-funded reinsur-
ance program (Exhibit 3). Again, the model went 
through five steps simulating such changes: 
1. First, participating state officials specified 
hypothetical reinsurance program parameters 
of policy interest to them. This meant iden-
tifying what population was to be targeted 
(e.g., small-firm workers and dependents), 
what dollar values of medical spending were 
to be reinsured (e.g., per person annual 
spending of $50,000–$100,000), and what 
percentage of that spending would be reim-
bursed by the state program (e.g., 90 percent 
of claims in corridor). 
2. Then the model estimated how much of 
insured medical spending would be reinsured 
and therefore how much premiums would be 
lowered by each set of parameters simulated.
3. Each simulated change in medical spend-
ing and associated premiums in turn drives 
changes in insurance behavior, the next stage 
in the simulation. Here, the model estimated 
which additional employers would newly 
offer coverage at the new prices.
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Source: Authors’ graphic. Note: ESI is employer-sponsored insurance; 
NG is non-group insurance (also called “individual” of “direct-pay” coverage).
Exhibit 3. Modeling the Dynamics of Reinsurance: Iterative Flow of Simulated Impacts
54. In parallel fashion, given new offers or 
changed premiums, more employees can be 
expected to take up those offers. Similarly, 
reduced non-group premiums stimulate more 
purchase of coverage outside the workplace. 
This step of the model calculated the extent 
to which these changes would occur.
5. In the model, changes in who enrolls in turn 
change the composition of the insured risk 
pool—the aggregation of medical spending 
that premiums must cover (along with the 
associated loadings). This step also accounted 
for the amount by which medical spending 
can be expected to rise for the newly insured 
because they have improved access to care. 
In turn, premiums adjust for all enrollees, 
including those previously covered—a pro-
cess of readjustment that occurs each year 
going forward. The simulation estimates 
the ultimate changes that can be expected 
to occur after successive responses to price 
shifts when all adjustments are complete. 
Finally, from these results, the model estimated 
the number of people ultimately expected to 
enroll and the accompanying cost in state sub-
sidy. Costs were estimated in 2007 dollars, and 
effects should be understood as occurring once 
the reinsurance subsidy program is fully imple-
mented, and insurer and purchaser responses 
are complete. It should be noted that ensuring 
the same impacts in the future will require the 
state to continue funding reinsurance of the 
same relative magnitude, that is, to index sub-
sidy to the underlying trend of medical spend-
ing. Reinsurance in and of itself does nothing to 
moderate the underlying cost growth in health 
insurance.
The Policy Contexts for 
Reinsurance in Three States
All three participating states had been working 
on insurance reform for some time when the 
Reinsurance Institute began. In each, reinsur-
ance had already become an important policy 
option. These histories were a major reason 
the states were interested in participation and 
selected to participate.
Rhode Island legislation that authorized a new, 
more affordable “wellness health benefit plan” 
had already been enacted.28 Lower premiums 
were to result mainly from a redesign of ben-
efits—for example, to emphasize wellness and 
prevention—intended to achieve a 25 percent 
reduction in premium. Reinsurance subsidy for 
low-wage individuals and employment groups 
was geared to save an additional 10 percent, 
with an estimated $24 million in subsidy.
The legislation passed without any funding 
source, but did contain a commitment to seek 
additional sources of funds in the future. No 
such funds had later been committed to reinsur-
ance, and perhaps for that reason, policymakers 
did not want modeling to simulate new funding 
for reinsurance. Rather, they wanted to address 
issues of risk segmentation within their existing 
non-group and small-group markets. Institute 
interactions with Rhode Island benefited from 
the planning and research already under way 
there. 29 Quantitative outputs for the state thus 
focused only initially on how to model outside 
subsidy; final modeling addressed reinsurance 
as a way to share high-end costs in a merger of 
small-group and non-group markets (the latter 
is termed direct-pay coverage in Rhode Island 
and some other states).30
Washington state had a long-standing interest 
in reinsurance. In 2005, the Office of the State 
Insurance Commissioner developed a reinsur-
ance proposal that was assessed by national 
experts but was never enacted.31 The state also 
had contracted for an actuarial analysis of a 
Healthy NY-style reinsurance approach for 
Washington.32 Even as the Reinsurance Institute 
and participating state officials were consulting 
on the appropriate scope of work for the state,33 
developments continued along other fronts, 
including a Blue Ribbon commission report,34 
a report from the Insurance Commissioner 
in response,35 and two new legislative enact-
ments.36 Washington state contracted separately 
for additional input from the Reinsurance 
Institute in light of these developments. In 
Washington, as in Rhode Island, state policy-
makers were interested in insurance for small 
firms and for non-group purchasers. They also 
wanted to adjust the reinsurance model to focus 
on people only with conventionally insured 
small-group or non-group coverage, omitting 
those covered under association plans or the 
high-risk pool, as noted earlier.
Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle had for some 
time promoted health care reform as a major 
priority. One component announced in January 
2006 was a Healthy Wisconsin policy proposal 
that was initially described as a version of 
Healthy NY. However, an implementing com-
mission, the Healthy Wisconsin Council, deter-
mined that the best approach was to focus on 
helping people with coverage to maintain that 
coverage by keeping it more affordable. The 
Council’s final report of January 2007 proposed 
targeting state reinsurance subsidy to insurance 
for the smallest of small firms, those with two 
through 10 employees.37 For the Reinsurance 
Institute modeling, Wisconsin policymakers 
sought information on what reinsurance could 
accomplish for a set amount of state subsidy—
some $100 million.38 Also of some interest 
was catastrophic reinsurance, as sketched out 
by Governor Doyle’s 2006 State of the State 
address. Its goal was to ensure that “no family 
should have to go bankrupt if they get sick.”39
Beginning on a site visit to Madison, the 
Reinsurance Institute focused on these propos-
als. Staff first learned about Wisconsin’s policy 
and insurance market contexts, then modeled 
the types of reinsurance that could be funded 
with the available resources.
Findings from the State 
Baseline Data 
State policymakers were generally quite interest-
ed in the baseline data for their states. Building 
upon prior surveys, the Reinsurance Institute 
model provided officials with a new perspective 
on insurance by combining information about 
population socio-demographics, employment, 
and insurance status with new estimates of likely 
insurance premiums. State officials took par-
ticular interest in profiles of health spending for 
their targeted populations—workers and depen-
dents with small-firm employers and people in 
the non-group market. In response, data were 
provided to states in an interactive spreadsheet 
that allowed state policymakers to extract and 
present the data as they liked.
Privately employed people in small-employer 
firms40 differed noticeably from the general 
population as well as from all private work-
ers, according to the baseline simulations for 
these states: The individuals were younger, had 
lower incomes, and were less likely to receive 
an employer offer of insurance (data not pre-
sented). Small-firm workers were also more 
likely to report fair or poor health than were 
other workers.
People who buy non-group insurance were 
the second group of interest. They are even 
more disadvantaged by high insurer cost load-
ing, but their medical expenditures differ.41 
In Washington state, for example, non-group 
enrollees averaged $3,200 per year in insured 
expenditure (2007$), compared with $3,900 for 
small-group enrollees.42 
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Within any group of insured or potentially 
insured individuals, medical spending varies sub-
stantially by person and is highly concentrated 
among a small percentage of very expensive 
individuals, as has often been noted.43 Wisconsin 
baseline data for people insured through small 
employers showed this pattern clearly (Exhibit 
4). Two-tenths (0.2) of 1 percent of the popula-
tion were estimated to spend $100,000 or more 
per person in 2007, accounting for more than 6 
percent of total spending. The top 1.2 percent 
of people were those spending $40,000 or more, 
and they accounted for 21 percent of spending. 
At the low end of spending, fully 93 percent of 
people spent under $10,000 a year, accounting 
for just over 45 percent of all insured medical 
spending for this set of people.44
From the perspective of Healthy NY-style rein-
surance, it is more instructive to consider how 
often per person annual spending falls within 
defined corridors, because that is what a new 
program would cover. For example, insured 
spending of above $100,000 a year accounted for 
barely 1 percent of total spending in Wisconsin’s 
small-group sector (Exhibit 5). In contrast, 
almost 65 percent of total dollars spent by insur-
ance fell under $10,000 per year per person. The 
reason that only 1.3 percent of dollars exceeded 
$100,000, whereas total spending by people who 
exceeded $100,000 was 6.4 percent, is that most 
spending even for high-spending people occurs 
in lower corridors of expense.
These data provide an important policy insight: 
Even before formal modeling, it is clear that 
catastrophic reinsurance that covers only very 
high spending corridors cannot significantly 
reduce underlying claims costs borne by primary 
insurers and therefore will not significantly affect 
premiums charged to enrollees. Achieving a large 
difference in premiums requires a much lower 
threshold, or attachment point, for reinsurance.
The baseline data also confirmed the common 
knowledge that insured spending increases with 
age. For example, Washingtonians covered 
through small firms and aged 51 to 64 years 
were estimated to average about $10,500 in 
health spending in 2007 (through insurance plus 
out-of-pocket). In contrast, those aged 0–18 
averaged some $2,600 (data not presented). 
Health status also greatly affects health spend-
ing, as less healthy people spend more. 
Age and health status have independent effects: 
At any age, people rating themselves in fair 
or poor health spent more than those in good 
health, good more than very good, and very 
good more than excellent, in Washington and 
elsewhere (Exhibit 6). 
Conversely, at any given level of health sta-
tus, older cohorts of people spend more than 
younger ones. The combination of age and 
health leads to quite large divergences, even 
without taking into account exactly which health 
conditions are associated with lower health 
status. People under 18 in excellent health aver-
aged annual insured spending of about $1,000, 
compared to about $10,000 for those in fair 
or poor health at upper ages. People in fair or 
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7poor health also pay substantially more per year 
out-of-pocket than do those in better health.45
This wide variation in average spending levels 
has important implications. First, it illustrates 
one reason why health insurance is a risky busi-
ness. An insurer needs to know what mix of risks 
can be expected to buy into each pool of risks 
the insurer creates in order to succeed in setting 
premiums that will cover incurred losses, and 
administrative expenses, and provide a return on 
capital. Insurers seek to make their risks predict-
able through underwriting and pooling a large 
number of similar risks. Insurers, to some extent, 
build a higher “risk premium” into return on 
capital where risks are less predictable, and in 
theory reinsurance could reduce that risk. 
Second, variation in expected spending across 
insured groups or individuals is the source of 
pressure for risk segmentation within markets 
where premium rate-making can take account 
of age and health status. That is, free markets 
tend to result in the separation of risk pools for 
relatively younger or healthier groups from risk 
pools containing older and less healthy groups. 
Segmentation of the pools allows better insur-
ance risks to obtain lower premiums. If state 
policy seeks broader pooling and less segmenta-
tion, reinsurance may play a supportive role. 
Finally, data like those in Exhibit 6 suggest 
that risk pools that contain more high-cost 
enrollees will benefit disproportionately from 
state-funded reinsurance that covers most of 
the spending in a high-cost corridor of annual 
claims expense. This expectation was tested in 
the modeling that followed the construction of 
the baseline dataset for each state.
Reinsurance Impacts Modeled 
for the Three States
Rhode Island. State policymakers were inter-
ested in a different kind of reinsurance configu-
ration for Rhode Island. They wanted to simu-
late an intervention that aggregated the state’s 
small and non-group market experience and 
that shifted funding across enrollees and their 
insurers via reinsurance funded by a 5 percent 
assessment on these markets.
This assessment was estimated to generate 
approximately $24.4 million of revenue in 
2007.46 These revenues were then used to simu-
late two different reinsurance corridors, one 
higher than the other but each with the same 10 
percent coinsurance rate. The rationale for this 
option was not to lower overall premiums by 
subsidy from state sources external to the insur-
ance market, as under Healthy NY. Instead, it 
was to require cross-subsidy within a market to 
offset some of the market’s segmentation—the 
observed tendency of competing insurers to 
serve different numbers of people at high risk 
of high annual spending.
The model found that the hypothesized $24.4 mil-
lion in funding would support only a very narrow 
reinsurance corridor if targeted at modestly high 
annual spending. The “affordable” corridor was 
estimated to be $5,000 to $6,427 for the aggregated 
small-group and non-group markets. The current 
non-group rating rules in Rhode Island divide that 
market into two pools of people based on health 
status. The reinsurance would result in net pre-
mium increases for enrollees in good health (both 
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8small-group and non-group) and decreases for 
non-group enrollees in poor health. Alternatively, 
the same revenue could fund a somewhat broader 
corridor of higher per-person spending—some 
$20,000 to $28,076. The higher corridor would 
lead to different patterns of cross-subsidy: Both 
the healthy and the less-healthy non-group pools 
would subsidize small-group enrollees.
The reason for the different effects of the two rein-
surance corridors is that expenditure distributions 
differ across these markets. Small-group enrollees 
have a higher proportion of their spending in high-
er expenditure categories, and thus would receive a 
larger share of the dollars from a reinsurance policy 
with the higher reinsurance corridor. The bifurca-
tion of the non-group market also affected the dis-
tributional effects of the two different reinsurance 
configurations, as the two non-group pools had 
different expenditure distributions.
These results were unintended. Sharing reinsur-
ance funding and payouts was not expected to 
disadvantage the non-group population. This 
surprising result illustrates the importance of 
developing information about reforms before 
implementing them.
The impact of the simulated reforms on premiums 
was relatively small. In the reinsurance configura-
tion with the lower corridor, we found that medical 
claims costs decreased by only 2.5 percent in the 
non-group pool of fair or poor health people, and 
decreased by 0.3 percent in the small-group mar-
ket under the configuration with the higher cor-
ridor. In each case, these decreases were offset by 
increases for the other groups.
The estimated changes from reinsurance were 
small largely because the simulated monetary 
shift of the reinsurance was small (the estimated 
$24.4 million). Putting more dollars into a 
reinsurance policy, especially from an external 
source, would further reduce premiums.
Washington. Modeling for the Reinsurance 
Institute simulated reinsurance for a range of 
spending corridors covering either all small-firm 
coverage, non-group coverage, or both. Twelve 
different configurations of reinsurance subsidy 
were modeled, including narrow, broad, and cata-
strophic forms of reinsurance.47 Formal simulation 
confirmed the baseline observation that having 
a relatively low attachment point for the reinsur-
ance corridor—between $5,000 and $25,000—was 
necessary to achieve large reductions in health 
insurance premiums for the eligible population. For 
these low attachment points, however, estimated 
government costs were substantial. 
Targeting the broadest population of eligibles 
(all small-firm and non-group coverage) and 
providing broad reinsurance that covers 90 per-
cent of spending from $10,000–$90,000) could 
be expected to achieve the following:
• The number of uninsured Washingtonians 
would fall by about 15 percent.
• Small-firm premiums for single coverage 
would fall by 30.5 percent on average, 33.0 
percent for family coverage; non-group  
premiums would fall by 38 percent for  
either coverage.
Reinsurance in State Health Reform
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9• Increased employer offer in small firms 
would be the main driver of change, resulting 
in increased coverage among employees not 
previously offered coverage.
• Gains in coverage would be lower among 
lower income families; they are less able to 
afford even subsidized coverage.48
• Estimated annual reinsurance costs to the state 
would be more than $880 million, including 
some $530 million for small-firm coverage and 
$350 million for the non-group market.
Most of the new state spending would go to 
subsidize coverage of people who already have 
coverage, including some with non-group cov-
erage who would switch to group. Among the 
reinsurance configurations simulated, those with 
wider corridors and lower carrier “retention” 
percentages (coinsurance obligations) had a 
greater impact on premiums. However, due to 
differences in the distribution of health expens-
es by factors such as age and health status, there 
were differences in the change in premiums 
for singles and families in different markets, 
depending on the attachment point, the width 
of the reinsurance corridor, and enrollment 
within each pool. For example, in our simula-
tions, those insured in the non-group market at 
baseline had a slightly larger share of their total 
insured dollars in the $10,000–$100,000 cor-
ridor than those currently insured through small 
employers. Therefore, policies targeting this 
corridor tend to have a slightly larger percentage 
change in premiums for the non-group market 
relative to the small firm market.
A second set of reinsurance simulations targeted 
smaller populations—the conventional small-
group and non-group markets. These simula-
tions, done under state contract, thus excluded 
from reinsurance all coverage obtained from 
association health plans (AHPs) or the state’s 
high-risk pool (WSHIP).49 These simulations 
built upon the observations about differences 
between conventionally insured small-groups 
and AHPs or WSHIP. Conventional cover-
ages contain more expensive enrollees than do 
AHPs, which may use medical underwriting, 
and WSHIP enrolls more higher spending peo-
ple than do conventional non-group coverages. 
The reconfigured simulations for non-group 
coverages were estimated to achieve nearly the 
same reduction in uninsurance as the paral-
lel simulations for all of non-group. Expected 
state spending for reinsuring claims, however, 
dropped substantially. The main reason for this 
is not the exclusion of the small WSHIP popu-
lation but rather the exclusion of uninsured 
members of simulated AHP households from 
non-group reinsurance subsidy.50
By more tightly targeting the non-AHP small-
group population, this new form of reinsurance 
was estimated to reduce uninsurance almost as 
much as the parallel prior reinsurance simulated 
for all small firms (including AHPs). Take-up was 
high because the premium drop was even higher 
than in the first simulations. Moreover, estimated 
government spending fell substantially. The reason 
for the savings was that the population eligible for 
subsidized coverage was only about half as large as 
under the prior simulations.
Comparing the new non-group versus small-group 
simulations, the former achieved greater impacts 
on premiums and on uninsurance, at lower expect-
ed state spending—again, largely because the target 
population was smaller. Comparing the new versus 
the earlier simulations, the former achieved almost 
as much impact with fewer resources. The magni-
tude of the difference was large enough to provide 
reasonable grounds for believing that the direction 
and nature of change between simulations are cor-
rect. However, little is known about the differences 
between the populations in conventionally insured 
small groups and those in firms covered by AHPs, 
so the magnitudes of the simulated impacts should 
be seen as general estimates.51
Wisconsin. Modeling done for Wisconsin 
simulated reinsurance of all coverage bought by 
very small employers (2–9 employees) for work-
ers and dependents. Three specifications costing 
$100 million each were modeled, at the request 
of policymakers. “Narrow” reinsurance was 
specified as coverage for a per-person annual 
corridor of $5,000–$17,500 with a 10 percent 
carrier retention. “Broad” reinsurance had a 
corridor of $15,000–$75,000, also with 10 per-
cent retention. “Catastrophic” was defined as 
open-ended coverage—which started at $14,000 
with coinsurance of 20 percent. Each of these 
configurations reflects the extent of reinsur-
ance affordable within the $100 million budget, 
assuming no increases in insured spending as a 
result of reinsurance.
Each of the three configurations was estimated 
to increase coverage by almost 6,000 people. 
This figure is sizeable compared with the 
baseline of 49,000 uninsured small-firm work-
ers and dependents. However, it is small (only 
about 1 percent) relative to the total number 
of uninsured people in Wisconsin. The cost to 
the state would be very high per newly insured 
person, about $17,000, because a large majority 
of the total $100 million subsidy would flow to 
the 170,000 small-firm workers and dependents 
already insured.
Thus, at least within the very small-group 
market, reinsurance subsidy dollars targeted 
on any of the three different corridors would 
achieve roughly the same increase in coverage.52 
However, the different corridors of reinsurance 
did have rather different distributional effects. 
For example, the “narrow” corridor decreased 
premiums about the same amount for both 
family and single coverage—by 19 and 20 per-
cent, respectively. In contrast, the “broad” cor-
ridor cut family premiums by 34 percent, and 
single premiums by only 7 percent.
The other type of catastrophic coverage of 
interest was protection against very high 
expenses that could bankrupt an individual or 
family. Such a program could not be formally 
modeled, as specifications were preliminary, key 
information was lacking, and full consideration 
would have gone beyond the scope of this proj-
ect.53 Baseline descriptive data did suggest the 
order of magnitude of state spending needed: 
For all Wisconsin residents in 2007, an estimat-
ed $492 million of insured medical expenditures 
were incurred above the threshold of $100,000 
per person per year. This amount would surely 
be catastrophic for uninsured people, but not 
for well-insured people whose primary coverage 
has a maximum limit on out-of-pocket spend-
ing. In any event, the dollars involved were 
much higher than the resources assumed to be 
available for small-firm reinsurance.
Modeling and Complementary 
Qualitative Inputs
Strengths and Limitations of Modeling
Modeling abstracts from reality, sufficiently sim-
plifying complexities to clarify overall relationships 
and effects. Our reinsurance model provides 
reasonable estimates of the likely magnitudes of 
expected reinsurance costs and impacts across 
populations and subpopulations within each state. 
Substantial efforts were made to benchmark the 
models’ components to state characteristics, to 
prevailing premiums, and to documented employer 
and consumer responses to price change.
The model can assess the overall effect of 
reinsurance alternatives on premiums, cover-
age, and costs; which firms offer coverage and 
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what people take up what coverage, when the 
benefits of reduced premiums are distributed 
in alternative ways; how the composition of 
insured risk pools change, with secondary 
impacts on premiums; and changes in the com-
position of the uninsured population. While the 
model has data on out-of-pocket and insured 
costs to enrollees, we must simulate poten-
tial health spending under insurance to those 
who are currently uninsured. Since our data 
include detailed health information from each 
individual, along with many other observable 
characteristics, we were able to predict insured 
health expenditures for the currently uninsured. 
A strength of the model already noted is that 
it contains good information on the uninsured 
and their circumstances—unlike insurance 
claims data, for example—which substantially 
increases the validity of estimates of expected 
reinsurance costs.
However, some uncertainty remains about the 
model’s findings on the magnitude of employ-
ers’ and individuals’ behavioral effects from 
reinsurance. Moreover, the simulation results 
are not budgetary estimates, as actual program 
spending would also depend upon many design 
and implementation choices not yet specified. 
Thus, final planning for program implementa-
tion calls for more detailed estimation as well as 
the ability to track early trends and make mid-
course corrections.
The model simulates employers’ and individu-
als’ behavior, not insurers’ behavior. In a sense, 
it estimates premiums for each market segment 
(here, non-group and small-group) as though 
there were competing insurers that act the same, 
and all coverage follows state rules. It is not 
possible to simulate every player in the insur-
ance market that provides coverage to small 
firms or their employees. The model does not 
address issues of insurance market competitive-
ness or estimate possible entry or exit from the 
markets. Similarly, it does not include variations 
in insurance benefits across carriers or market 
segments; in order to better estimate consumer 
response to premium change, it holds benefit 
design constant. 
Finally, insurers’ different underwriting and 
pricing behaviors are not modeled, and results 
accordingly do not include how different insur-
ers might respond differently to reinsurance in 
marketing and pricing. The model assumes that 
carriers pass through 100 percent of the reinsur-
ance subsidy into lower premiums, and continue 
to manage high-cost claims as before. Different 
assumptions could increase estimated govern-
ment spending on reinsurance and/or reduce 
the impacts on coverage.
Model construction lacked information from 
which to simulate insurer underwriting; it 
assumed open enrollment into all available 
coverages (which is required by federal law for 
small-group coverage, but not for non-group 
insurance). Variations of premiums across sub-
populations of people that arise from coverage 
through different insurers are not simulated, nor 
are differences across separate blocks of cover-
age that an insurer may price separately based 
on factors other than underlying expenditures.54 
In the case of Washington, there was no direct 
evidence on the difference in medical claims 
spending in two different market sectors for 
small-firm coverage that are regulated differ-
ently. There, the simulations simply made rea-
sonable assumptions based on qualitative input 
from key informants. The model for each state 
was constructed, however, to accurately reflect 
average premium for all small firms as well as 
the variation across firms observed among all 
small firms.
Qualitative Inputs
The quantitative simulations leave a substantial 
role for qualitative analysis and program design 
to address uncertainties. Even in the course of 
this project, quantitative modeling needed to be 
informed by qualitative expertise and experience 
to understand the policy and market contexts 
within which reinsurance would apply. Such back-
ground came from a literature review and discus-
sions with project officials from the three states, 
as well as with other knowledgeable sources from 
government and insurers. These all contributed 
to the project’s ability to tailor the generic model 
to each state. For one state it was possible to 
make a site visit; for another, state staff came 
to Washington, D.C., for a consultation. Most 
information was obtained by telephone, Internet 
searches, and other off-site sources.
Qualitative inputs also added practical dimen-
sions to the quantitative analyses. For example, 
insurance rating rules had to be specified and 
the face validity of modeled premiums checked 
in light of state-specific reports and interview 
information. At times, state policymakers also 
sought qualitative advice about policy. For 
example, the Reinsurance Institute staff was 
asked for input on a draft insurance report in 
Washington.55
Finally, qualitative assessment was needed to 
consider other goals sometimes cited for rein-
surance, that is, to alter insurer and employer 
behavior so as to reduce risk selection and 
help stabilize markets for coverage over time. 
Quantitative modeling is not helpful here in 
part because the interventions and their goals 
are incompletely specified, in part because infor-
mation is lacking about who is eligible for and 
who has certain types of coverage, and in part 
because insurer marketing and pricing strategies 
are not straightforward and easily modeled.
Qualitative Assessment of 
Unmodeled Changes in Costs
The reinsurance model estimated the effects on 
insurance premiums and coverage of reinsur-
ance-reduced medical claims costs. The formal 
modeling did not take into account some new 
costs that will tend to reduce the effective size 
of the intended subsidy, nor some new sav-
ings that might increase it. Our perspective is 
that the size of these additional factors is too 
uncertain to warrant formal modeling at this 
stage, and that the new costs and savings to 
some extent offset one another, so that it is 
not unreasonable to have omitted them. This 
section provides qualitative observations about 
these additional cost impacts of reinsurance.
Reduced Insurer Risk Premums
Reinsurance should to some extent reduce the 
risk that insurers take in underwriting the target-
ed population. It could thus lower insurers’ costs 
by the reduced extent of risk-based capital they 
need to hold or by the reduction in “risk premi-
um” they need to charge in light of risk to their 
profit expectations or even their capital.56 The 
effect is similar to the interest savings achieved 
by borrowers with a higher bond rating.
Plausibly, the high loadings seen in premi-
ums for small-group and non-group coverage 
reflects the higher risk premiums they contain; 
after all, risk is least predictable for these cover-
ages. However, most of this higher administra-
tive cost appears to consist of higher sales and 
commissions, bad debt and other factors.57 
Similarly, some observers have suggested that 
the experience of Healthy NY shows that rein-
surance achieves substantial savings by reducing 
carriers’ risk premiums. It is true that the initial 
premiums set by Healthy NY plans were lower 
than actuarially expected. Moreover, recent pre-
miums have remained below prevailing prices in 
private, unsubsidized markets.
Reinsurance in State Health Reform
11
However, other explanations also apply. First, 
Healthy NY trims premiums relative to pri-
vate coverage by reducing the benefit package. 
Second, Healthy NY could have attracted an 
unusually low-risk enrollee population. The 
latter hypothesis is that previously uninsured 
people in New York had disproportionately low 
risk of medical claims. Previously available cov-
erages had to be priced under stringent require-
ments of community rating, which reduced 
prices to high risks and increased them for low 
risks, thus encouraging higher risk people to 
enroll and discouraging lower risks. Higher risks 
who had previously bought coverage were ineli-
gible for Healthy NY, but uninsured lower risks 
could enroll. There is evidence from current 
premiums and loss ratios that this hypothesis 
explains much of the premium differentials 
observed (see box).58
In sum, some level of risk premium savings 
probably can be achieved, but its size is not 
known with any certainty, and it is likely small.
Other Lower Costs in Targeted 
Insurance Market
Cost savings of two types would also plausibly 
occur: First, reinsurance could reduce the need 
for medical underwriting in non-group or small-
group markets because higher risks’ higher costs 
would be subsidized. Less underwriting would 
reduce insurers’ administrative costs, likely by a 
small amount, as other costs contribute more to 
insurance loading. Casual empiricism suggests 
that a middle range of reinsurance rather than 
catastrophic reinsurance would have greater 
impact on the incentives for medical underwrit-
ing. Actuaries generally believe that very high 
expenditures per year are mainly random, but 
that many chronic illnesses predictably generate 
above-average costs at lower levels. 
Second, reinsurance subsidy could achieve 
savings if employers’ premiums were suf-
ficiently lowered so that many fewer firms 
would shop for new coverage in a given year. 
Reduced marketplace “churning” would save 
on expenses for search, sales, and underwriting. 
Nationally, smaller firms are much more likely 
to change coverage from year-to-year than are 
large firms.59 Such savings would accrue both 
to insurers and to firms, in the form of lower 
search and transactions costs.
Higher Administrative Costs
One un-simulated new cost is administrative 
operating expenses. A new reinsurance program 
will require new activities both for the state 
and for primary carriers. Initially, there will be 
one-time, start-up costs. Once a program is 
under way, there will be operating and oversight 
expenses of several kinds.60
Public start-up costs can be substantial, 
although experience varies. Set-up activities 
include: creating a governance structure and 
mechanisms (e.g., board, plan of operations); 
contracting for administrative services and sys-
tems; acquiring claims and accounting software; 
entering into contracts for professional services 
such as law and accounting; hiring or arranging 
for actuarial support; and establishing budgetary 
and financial systems, including holding of fis-
cal reserves, and arranging for banking services 
(e.g., negotiated line of credit). These will vary 
according to the design of a reinsurance pro-
gram as well as by state and the extent of exist-
ing capabilities within state agencies.
On an ongoing basis, primary insurers eligible 
to receive reinsurance will incur costs of claims 
documentation and submission, of cooperation 
with oversight and audit requirements, as well 
as for dispute resolution. State administrators 
will incur such costs as general administration, 
claims processing, monitoring of claims and 
insurers, retrospective auditing, and potentially 
collection of assessments. Using existing exper-
tise within the administration or contracting out 
for specialized services could hold costs down, 
and the existence of substantial fixed costs 
likely creates economies of scale (that is, higher 
claims volume lowers the percentage load of 
administrative cost). Other influences on level 
of expense include: the complexity of reinsur-
ance activities, the number of insurers in the 
program, audit frequency and scope, the extent 
of year-to-year changes in the program, and the 
requirements of a state’s administrative proce-
dure act and budgeting processes.
Overall, administrative costs should not be large 
as a percentage of claims payouts. From other 
experience, we estimate that state administrative 
costs would amount to at most an additional 1 
to 3 percent of claims costs, depending upon 
how active administrators are. Healthy NY may 
cost even less, although its costs appear to be 
spread across a number of administrative enti-
ties.61 We have no basis for thinking that private 
costs would be any larger, but private costs will 
exist and will be higher for primary firms that 
do not already buy private reinsurance. They 
will be also be higher to the extent that the new 
state program varies from industry practice or 
imposes new verification or auditing require-
ments because of the need for public account-
ability. To the limited extent that private carriers 
might reduce or drop private reinsurance, the 
new administrative costs for public reinsurance 
would be offset by reduced expenses for private 
reinsurance.
Increased Medical Claims Costs under 
Reinsured Primary Coverage
People’s behavior can be expected to change 
whenever they do not bear the full cost of 
their choices. One example is that previously 
uninsured people spend more on health care 
after they obtain insurance coverage because 
it costs less at the point of care.62 The reinsur-
ance model therefore includes an “inducement” 
Why Does Healthy NY Have Low Premiums?
In 2005, premiums for Healthy NY were 45 to 51 percent lower than small 
group premiums in New York, and 69 to 71 percent lower than non-group 
HMO premiums in New York. Given these dramatically lower premiums, 
medical loss ratios (health claims divided by premiums) would be high if Healthy 
NY’s enrollees had similar levels of health risk as small-group and non-group 
enrollees. However, for Healthy NY plans between 2003 and 2005, unadjusted 
medical loss ratios (before reinsurance subsidy) ranged between 114 percent 
and 122 percent, and stop-loss adjusted medical loss ratios ranged between 89 
percent and 92 percent (after subsidy). Further, fewer than 6 percent of Healthy 
NY enrollees reached the $5,000 reinsurance or stop-loss threshold in 2005. 
Together, these data suggest that Healthy NY enrollees have lower health risks, 
that is, they have lower levels of medical claims experience than do other small 
group and non-group enrollees. (All data come from the latest annual evaluation 
of the program.)
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factor to account for this predictable shift. 
Insurance may increase individuals’ incentives 
to over-consume both cost-effective and unnec-
essary health care. Additional spending under 
insurance is often termed “moral hazard,” but 
it is a normal response to incentives and may 
be desirable if the extra services consumed 
improve health.
A less desirable shift in incentives will occur to 
some extent after reinsurance: Primary carriers’ 
medical claims costs can be expected to increase 
in the reinsured corridor because carriers’ cost-
containment efforts will be more helpful to 
the state than to the carriers. It is plausible that 
a lower corridor would have more effect on 
insurer behavior, as more claims would be cov-
ered. The effect of reinsurance would extend 
even below the reinsured corridor, as primary 
insurers that better controlled costs, even below 
the threshold of reinsurance, would receive 
lower subsidy. 
We lacked a basis for estimating the strength of 
insurers’ claims-handling responses to reinsur-
ance and so did not estimate their size in the 
formal modeling. In our interviews, we did hear 
some complaints that Healthy NY-style reinsur-
ance does not distinguish between high expen-
ditures due to high health risks from those due 
to lax cost containment. Some political resis-
tance to reinsurance can be expected as a result.
The prospect of reduced cost control is serious, 
and program countermeasures appear essential 
in a practical reinsurance program. Some coun-
termeasures are built into the structure of rein-
surance: Primary insurers’ coinsurance obliga-
tions are a basic design feature that help main-
tain some incentive to manage high-cost claims 
even in the reinsured corridor. The ceiling on 
reinsurance reimbursement provides additional 
incentive, as unmanaged cases that exceed the 
ceiling must be fully paid by the primary carrier. 
(This observation holds true only so long as the 
reinsurance ceiling is lower than the prevailing 
upper limits of the reinsured private market 
sector. If reinsurance goes to higher levels or 
is unlimited, private ceilings can be expected 
to rise, which will also somewhat expand heath 
spending.) To strengthen the incentive for pri-
mary carriers to economize, it might be prefera-
ble at any given level of state subsidy to increase 
the width of the corridor while also increasing 
the size of the carrier’s coinsurance requirement 
or retention. 
Additional measures also seem desirable, includ-
ing requirements of early reporting for impend-
ing large claims and mandatory use of the same 
forms of disease management and high-cost 
case management an insurer uses in its fully 
private accounts. Private reinsurers have the 
advantage of raising premiums or dropping cov-
erage if a primary insurer under-manages claims. 
An analogous mechanism can be imagined 
for a public subsidy program, but introducing 
uncertainty into insurers’ expectations of year-
end reinsurance reimbursements would affect 
their willingness to reduce premiums up front. 
Less important, new controls would to some 
extent increase administrative complexity and 
expense. Further attention is needed to such 
cost controls during practical design of reinsur-
ance programs. 
The Impacts of Reinsurance in 
Policy Perspective
Many different benefits have been cited for 
reinsurance programs.63 It is appropriate to clar-
ify just what goals predominate in any state, so 
as to better assess how they may be addressed 
by reinsurance or other interventions. Two 
broad state policy goals can be distinguished. 
The first is to help residents obtain coverage by 
subsidizing its cost. This was the focus of the 
modeling done for this project. Second, some 
state policymakers are considering reinsurance 
as a way to improve the operation of insurance 
markets, especially to reduce risk segmentation, 
as an adjunct to regulatory approaches. This is 
a matter for qualitative consideration now that 
would benefit further work later.
Subsidy for Insurance Consumers
The central issues for subsidy are how much 
benefit it achieves within its target population 
and at what cost. Healthy NY explicitly tar-
geted only people without pre-existing cover-
age. Accordingly, it has achieved high “target 
efficiency”64 in terms of the number of people 
newly insured for a limited amount of subsidy. 
Under the Reinsurance Institute, in contrast, 
there was strong state interest in doing more 
to help people who already had coverage, espe-
cially from small employer groups. The Healthy 
Wisconsin Council, according to key infor-
mants, explicitly rejected the Healthy NY model 
in favor of helping small firms that were strug-
gling to help themselves by buying costly insur-
ance. It can be seen as simply unfair to help the 
uninsured but not those who have previously 
scrimped to buy coverage and who are similar 
in income or work status.  
Small firms are a familiar target for special gov-
ernment help of many types. Moreover, small 
firms are what have been called the “bleeding 
edge” of health care problems65: They have 
always been less able than large firms to offer 
insurance, especially if they can pay only low 
wages, because they face high internal admin-
istrative costs as well as high insurance premi-
ums in light of such factors as high employee 
turnover and adverse selection.66  Firms with 
many low-wage workers are less able to pass 
costs back to workers through either lower 
wages or higher out-of-pocket costs.  Subsidies 
to small firms in the amounts modeled for 
Washington or Wisconsin can be seen as offset-
ting small-firms’ disadvantage relative to large 
firms in percentage of insurance loading costs. 
Policymakers there were most interested in 
options that lowered targeted insurance premi-
ums by about one-third.
However, there is a cost to forgoing target effi-
ciency in favor of broader equity or help to small 
employer populations. Funding a subsidy for a 
broader population obviously costs more than 
for a narrower one. For a broad configuration of 
reinsurance in Washington, the total estimated 
state cost was almost $900 million, or nearly 
$10,000 per newly insured person.67 In Wisconsin 
the cost was even higher per newly insured per-
son, although total estimated state spending was 
held down by targeting only very small groups 
(those with between two and nine employees).
The reason for high spending under broad 
reinsurance is that so much of the subsidy 
goes to people already insured. Most of the 
latter are people with existing group coverage, 
who can be seen as solidifying their coverage 
by having it made more affordable. Some are 
people induced by reinsurance to “upgrade” 
from non-group to small-group coverage, which 
offers richer and newly affordable benefits. In 
the Washington simulation just noted, existing 
insureds receiving subsidy outnumbered newly 
insureds by 10-to-1. The subsidy for the already 
insured was thus almost $900 per person, 
enough to reduce pre-existing insurance premi-
ums by about one-third. 
Thus, broad reinsurance subsidy is not cost-
effective relative to more targeted subsidies, if 
considered solely as a tool for increasing cover-
age. Its value must lie in the benefits of helping 
small firms afford coverage, as just noted, or 
in the broader effects on insurance markets, as 
considered next.
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Effects on the Insurance Market
Broader effects of reinsurance include the pros-
pect of greater year-to-year stability in insurance 
premiums and reducing risk segmentation or 
offsetting its effects. 
Market Stability. Small employers and non-
group coverage lack the stable risk pools that 
characterize large employment groups. Risks are 
hard to predict because group size is small and 
insurers fear adverse selection. High-cost claims 
in any one year are said to cause sudden rate 
increases for small groups in the following year, 
and insurance enrollment patterns and prices 
can change quickly as employers seek better 
terms elsewhere.68 To the extent that reinsurance 
can avoid sudden price shifts, it would enhance 
the peace of mind of small-business owners, a 
notable although unmeasurable benefit.
Kansas and Wisconsin policymakers have 
argued that reinsurance would reduce year-to-
year price shifts and increase market stability.69 
This project was unable to produce any quan-
titative estimates of how large such benefits 
might be or to consider whether low-corridor 
or catastrophic reinsurance would do more to 
enhance stability. Information was lacking on 
the extent and costs of churning after high-
claims experience, on insurer pricing models, 
and on how much insurance-purchasing firms 
value price stability apart from price level.
Risk Segmentation. Outside of large employer 
group insurance pools, the incentives for 
risk segmentation are large, as noted above. 
Individuals and groups that expect below-
average medical spending are highly motivated 
to seek lower cost plans, and an insurer is 
rewarded with their business if it pools them 
with only with other lower risk applicants.70 
Pressures for insurance markets to segment 
themselves into different plans by level of risk 
are inevitable whenever there is such variation 
in costs across potential insureds together with 
private risk bearing.
Risk segmentation can make insurance unaf-
fordable for older people and those with 
chronic illness or other risk factors, and increase 
medical underwriting costs even for those able 
to obtain coverage. One regulatory response in 
many states has been to limit underwriting or 
constrain variation in rates. However, even if 
insurance rules require issue of coverage to all 
comers and community rating of premiums is 
perfectly enforced, selection can occur as lower 
risks chose to self-insure or go bare, or as firms 
or individuals choose to buy different plans  
as a result of differential attractiveness of dif-
ferent benefit packages to people with different 
levels of risk.
Publicly funded reinsurance subsidizes a layer of 
high costs, thus acting to pool those costs to be 
funded by a source independent of the premi-
um each enrollee has paid. Reinsurance thus has 
the potential to reduce pressures for selection 
or to offset its effects on premiums. In effect, 
reinsurance reduces the benefits of selection 
relative to the costs of achieving it. Reinsurance 
can thus serve as a kind of risk-adjustment 
mechanism, one that is based upon actually 
incurred medical costs rather than prediction 
of costs as for risk-adjusted premiums. This 
potential makes reinsurance of interest to state 
policymakers seeking to avoid the distributional 
and social impacts of selection.
Conceptually, the design and targeting of rein-
surance will affect its ability to reduce pressures 
for risk segmentation. Conventional actuarial 
wisdom suggests that very high-end or cata-
strophic reinsurance will not have much impact, 
as costs in that range occur almost randomly, 
with little predictability. Reinsurance of much 
lower corridors of annual spending plausibly 
will more greatly reduce expected costs for peo-
ple with chronic illnesses or otherwise identifi-
ably high risks. Thus, the lowered Healthy NY 
threshold of $5,000 seems likely to have greater 
impact on selection pressure than the higher 
original threshold of $30,000, or the even higher 
thresholds common in private reinsurance 
meant to protect an insurer’s solvency. Even 
so, some incentive for risk selection remains, as 
insurers must cover below-threshold spending 
plus the retention percentage of spending within 
the reinsured corridor. As an extreme example, 
New York requires both that insurers accept all 
applicants and that they charge the same com-
munity rate to all. The reinsurance tends to off-
set the costs of adhering to those rules.
Two of the Reinsurance Institute’s participat-
ing states requested modeling of reinsurance 
designs that would be similarly supportive of 
other rules that seek to help higher risk people. 
Rhode Island wanted to model the use of 
insurer assessments to make insurers with lower 
expenditures in a reinsured corridor subsidize 
insurers with higher such spending. Among 
other configurations, Washington wanted to 
model reinsurance only for conventional small-
group coverage, for which insurers may not use 
medical underwriting and must use modified 
community rating for all enrollees. This sector 
competes with AHPs that may consider health 
status in deciding whether to offer coverage 
and how much premium to charge. Reinsurance 
appears better suited to complement other 
approaches than to serve as a stand-alone strat-
egy. More information is needed about patterns 
of selection and analysis of policies designed 
to change them than was feasible under this 
project.71
Lessons from the Reinsurance 
Institute about Technical 
Assistance for States
Some concluding observations can be made 
about Reinsurance Institute interactions with the 
three participating states. Benchmarking to state 
data was very important for the credibility of our 
modeling among knowledgeable people in each 
state. Washington was so concerned about in-state 
perceptions about the accuracy of baseline data 
that it was willing to pay for using state socio-
demographic survey data in lieu of federal CPS 
information. Beyond that, for targeted simulations, 
it was essential to benchmark to state counts of 
target populations of particular interest, notably the 
conventional small-group market in Washington, 
and both the non-group and small-group markets 
in Rhode Island.72 Indeed, simply “knowing the 
territory” helped build credibility and institutional 
knowledge even when it did not offer direct inputs 
into modeling. 
Early specifications of reinsurance parameters 
often needed reformulation over time, and 
states sometimes needed to refine their model-
ing requests to focus on their highest priorities. 
Frequent give-and-take with participating state 
staff was very helpful throughout the project. It 
began with the useful interactions at the kick-
off meeting that included all interested states.
State policymakers often thought about cover-
age and its impacts in terms of very specific 
types of existing insurance. In contract, the 
generic Reinsurance Institute model was built to 
be very specific about population characteristics 
but general about insurance plans. The initial 
model had baseline data on non-group cover-
age, for example, but had no basis for knowing 
which of that coverage came from special state 
programs like the Washington Basic Health 
Plan, state high-risk pools, or either of the two 
different pools of private non-group coverage 
offered in Rhode Island. Some analyses of inter-
est therefore required substantial repartitioning 
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of the baseline data to simulate targeting of 
reinsurance of interest to states.
State officials liked quick-turnaround estimates. 
They also greatly appreciated the ability to 
perform their own rough estimates of likely 
reinsurance costs. To give them the flexibility to 
select corridors of their own choice, each state 
was provided with an interactive spreadsheet 
that allowed its users to calculate the amount of 
baseline-insured expenditures within different 
expenditure corridors for non-group coverage 
and groups of different sizes. This provided 
them with estimates of approximate dollar 
values of different reinsurance configurations, 
based on selected reinsurance corridor and 
coinsurance rate.
As intended, modeling can help avoid surprises 
during actual implementation, such as Healthy 
NY’s finding that little medical spending and 
hence little reinsurance subsidy occurred in 
the initially set high corridor for reinsurance. 
For example, Rhode Island modeling found 
that sharing reinsurance funding and payouts 
between non-group and small-group markets 
actually disadvantaged the non-group popula-
tion. Washington modeling found that reinsur-
ance provided more help to upper income peo-
ple. Such potentially unintended or surprising 
results illustrate the importance of developing 
substantial information about reforms before 
implementing them. 
Modeling’s demand for clear specifications of 
parameters appeared to encourage more careful 
thinking among involved state officials about 
the need to clarify policy goals and a logic 
model of how reinsurance might help achieve 
them. Interactions with state clients also tended 
to clarify that reinsurance is not one thing, but 
rather a family of interventions. For example, 
the retrospective Healthy NY-style reinsurance 
modeled here was quite different from the 
prospective reinsurance mechanism created by 
many small-group market reforms of the 1990s. 
Moreover, different designs or targeting of rein-
surance subsidy can serve different policy goals. 
Finally, reinsurance is better seen as a comple-
ment to other reforms than as a stand-alone 
reform. Reinsurance Institute modeling had 
to take into account what other reform rules 
applied to the target populations and coverages. 
Indeed, state policymakers under this project 
frequently wanted to consider broader reform 
issues than reinsurance and many state reform 
proposals reflect the broadening of the coverage 
expansion discussion. 
About the Authors
Randall R. Bovbjerg is a principal research 
associate in the Health Policy Center of the 
Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. and served 
as principal investigator (PI) of this reinsur-
ance project. Health reform has long been 
one of his research interests, and he helped 
lead the District of Columbia’s State Planning 
Grant. Before coming to the Institute, he was 
a state insurance regulator. A. Bowen Garrett 
is a senior research associate in the Center and 
served as co-PI. Microsimulation modeling is 
one of his specialties, and he is also leading 
the Urban Institute’s broader effort to model 
health insurance reforms. Lisa Clemans-Cope 
is a research associate in the Center and also a 
specialist in health insurance and simulations. 
She helped generate Health Insurance Reform 
Simulation Model results for Massachusetts, for 
example, to help policymakers predict results 
prior to that state’s universal health reform. Paul 
Masi is a research assistant whose work in the 
Center primarily helps evaluate state coverage 
expansions. He provides quantitative support to 
senior researchers, working with numerous large 
databases.
Endnotes
1 Vaughan, E. J. and T.M. Vaughan. Fundamentals 
of Risk and Insurance, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, January 1999; American Academy of Actuaries, 
“Medical Reinsurance: Considerations for Designing a 
Government-Sponsored Program,” Issue Brief, January 
2005, http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/reinsurance_
jan05.pdf.
2 Bovbjerg, R. “Reform of Financing for Health 
Coverage: What Can Reinsurance Accomplish?” Inquiry 
29(2):158-175, Summer 1992; Chollet, D. “The Role 
of Reinsurance in State Efforts to Expand Coverage,” 
Washington, DC: AcademyHealth, State Coverage 
Initiatives, Issue Brief, Vol. V, No. 4, October 2004, 
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief1004.pdf. 
See also discussion below.
3 American Academy of Actuaries. “Medical Reinsurance: 
Considerations for Designing a Government-Sponsored 
Program,” Issue Brief, January 2005, http://www.actu-
ary.org/pdf/health/reinsurance_jan05.pdf; Swartz, K. 
Reinsuring Health: Why More Middle-class People Are 
Uninsured and What Government Can Do, New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2006.
4 State Coverage Initiatives. State of the States 2007: 
Building Hope, Raising Expectations, Washington, DC: 
AcademyHealth, January 2007, http://statecoverage.net/
pdf/StateofStates2007.pdf.
5 Holahan, J., and L. Blumberg. “Massachusetts Health 
Care Reform: A Look At The Issues,” Health Affairs 25, 
No. 6: w432-w443 (published online September 14, 2006; 
doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.25.w432).
6 State Coverage Initiatives. Profiles in Coverage: Healthy New 
York, January 2005, http://statecoverage.net/newyork-
profile.htm. The Healthy NY Web page is www.ins.state.
ny.us/website2/hny/english/hny.htm. For an overview 
of early experience, see Swartz, K. Reinsurance: How 
States Can Make Health Coverage More Affordable for 
Employers and Workers, New York, NY: Commonwealth 
Fund, 2005, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publi-
cations/publications_show.htm?doc_id=286904.
7 Powell, Y.L., S. Van Tassell, and E. Juhl. Report on the 
Healthy NY Program 2007, prepared for the State of New 
York Insurance Department, Washington, DC: EP&P 
Consulting, Inc., January 2008, http://www.ins.state.
ny.us/website2/hny/reports/hnyepp2007.pdf.
8 This report, like many others, uses “non-group” to 
describe insurance bought by individuals rather than 
employer groups. Such insurance is also called “individu-
al” or “direct-pay” coverage. However, “individual” cov-
erage also means coverage only of a single worker under 
employer-sponsored insurance, as opposed to “family” 
coverage. Non-group is used here to avoid that ambiguity.
9 Kansas Insurance Department. “Finding and Filling 
the Gaps: Developing a Strategic Plan to Cover All 
Kansans,” HRSA State Planning Grant Report to the 
Secretary, Grant Period October 1, 2000–September 29, 
2001, http://www.statecoverage.net/statereports/ks.pdf. 
Reinsurance was only part of Kansas’s planning; other 
options being considered were expansion of public pro-
grams (Medicaid, HealthWave); facility-based insurance; 
enhanced small employer tax credit program; expanding 
access to employer-sponsored health insurance through 
Medicaid and HealthWave; regulatory changes; and state 
employee health plan expansions. 
10 State Coverage Initiatives (SCI), “Reinsurance Institute,” 
http://www.statecoverage.net/reinsuranceinstitute.htm.
11  See discussions in Bovbjerg, R. “Reinsurance,” 1992, op 
cit. and Vaughan and Vaughan, Fundamentals, 1999, op cit.
12 Chollet, “The Role of Reinsurance,” 2004, op cit.
13 All HMOs in New York must participate in Healthy NY. 
Among plans participating throughout 2006, 16 were 
HMOs and one was an EPO. Chu and Van Tassell, 2006 
Report, op cit.
14 See, for example, the list of services offered by Summit 
Reinsurance Services, Inc., http://www.summit-re.com/
managedcare.asp.
15 EP&P Consulting, Inc. Report on the Healthy NY 
Program 2004, Washington, DC: EP&P Consulting, 
December 31, 2004, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/
hny/reports/hnyepp2004.pdf.
16 Lutzky, A.W., and R. Bovbjerg. The Role of Reinsurance in 
Medicaid Managed Care, Princeton, NJ: Center for Health 
Care Strategies, Inc., Resource Paper under the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Medicaid Managed Care 
Program, October 2003, http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/
reinsurance.pdf. Some states withhold a share of capita-
tion and provide the reinsurance themselves; others 
require the plans to buy private reinsurance from the capi-
tation received.
17 Adverse selection occurs when a given insurance policy 
attracts less healthy enrollees. The resulting higher claims 
experience raises premiums, which discourages even 
lower-risk enrolment forces yet higher premiums. In the 
extreme, selection effects can cause a “death spiral” that 
makes coverage unaffordable for most and drives carriers 
out of the affected line of business. Vaughn and Vaughn, 
Fundamentals, 1999, op cit. For an illustrative discus-
sion in one policy context, see “Illustrating the Potential 
Impacts of Adverse Selection on Health Insurance Costs 
in Consumer Choice Models,” in series Snapshots: Health 
Care Costs, Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, 
November 2006, http://www.kff.org/insurance/snap-
shot/index.cfm.
18 Healthcare Group (HCG) is the state’s framework for 
helping small businesses buy managed care on the afford-
able model created by the Arizona’s Health Care Cost 
Containment System (AHCCCS), the state’s Medicaid 
program. HCG also begun in the mid-1980s, and its 
private plans are ones that also serve AHCCCS. In 
addition to offsetting adverse selection, the reinsurance 
subsidy protected the plans’ bottom lines by promising 
that medical costs would never exceed an agreed share of 
the private premiums, about 60 percent. This plan-level 
15
protection provided during 1999-2004 was a form of 
“aggregate” reinsurance, which covers claims in excess 
of a share of premium each year, whereas Healthy NY 
features “specific” reinsurance that covers losses above 
a per-person annual threshold. Some private reinsurance 
arrangements feature both types of protection, under 
which the specific coverage bears a larger share of risk. 
Since 2004, HCG plans have been required to buy private 
reinsurance to protect their solvency, and the state puts a 
share of premium into a “stop loss” fund available as an 
aggregate backstop. See Office of the Auditor General. 
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System—Healthcare 
Group Program, Special Audit, Performance Audit Division, 
Report No. 06–02, February 2006, http://www.ahcccs.
state.az.us/Contracting/OpenRFPs/YH07-0023/Q&A_
Attach3HCGAuditorsReport100506.pdf; State Coverage 
Initiatives. Profiles in Coverage: Healthcare Group of Arizona, 
Washington, DC: AcademyHealth, April 2007, http://
statecoverage.net/arizonaprofile.pdf.
19 The Reinsurance Institute was “a new technical assistance 
offering” of 2006-2007 that brought “states together that 
are seriously considering the development and design of 
a state public reinsurance program [in part] to create a 
network of interested states that can exchange knowledge 
about this strategy,” http://www.statecoverage.net/rein-
suranceinstitute.htm. The project was led by The Urban 
Institute in collaboration with Pool Administrators, Inc., 
and Actuarial Research Corporation, along with insurer 
and academic consultants.
20 The microsimulation model of reinsurance constructed 
for this project benefited from prior Urban Institute expe-
rience with HIRSIM. See Blumberg, L.J., et al. The Health 
Insurance Reform Simulation Model (HIRSM), Urban Institute 
Research Report, July 31, 2003, http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410867_HIRSM_Report.pdf. Qualitative 
capabilities came from prior Urban Institute work, for 
example, Bovbjerg, R. “Implementing Reinsurance: 
Health Insurance Reform in Missouri,” St. Louis: Missouri 
Foundation for Health, Cover Missouri Project Report 11, 
2006, accessible at http://www.mffh.org/CoverMo11.pdf; 
as well as from the experience of subcontractors Actuarial 
Research Corporation and Pools Administrators, Inc., in 
public and private insurance and practical operation of 
state pools.
21 Garrett, A.B., et al. The Urban Institute’s MicroSimulation Model 
for Reinsurance: Model Construction and State-Specific Application, 
Companion Report to this document. 
22 For much more detail on the model, see Garrett, A.B., et 
al. The Urban Institute’s MicroSimulation Model for Reinsurance: 
Model Construction and State-Specific Application, Urban 
Institute Report to the State Coverage Initiatives Program 
AcademyHealth, Washington, DC, April 2008. On 
Washington-specific baseline construction, see Clemans-
Cope, L., et al. “Washington Specific Requests of 
Reinsurance Institute,” Memorandum to Jenny Hamilton 
(Office of Financial Management) and Pete Cutler (Office 
of the Insurance Commissioner), December 17, 2007, 
revised January  8, 2008.
23 The reported spending is made consistent with the 
two other sources: (1) the National Health Accounts 
maintained by federal actuaries (http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/NationalHealthExpendData/), using methods 
similar to those of  Sing, M., et al. “Reconciling Medical 
Expenditure Estimates from the MEPS and NHEA,” 
Health Care Financing Review 28(1): 25-40, Fall 2006; and 
(2) high-cost claims data maintained by actuaries. See 
Society of Actuaries, “Medical Large Claims Experience 
Study,” Web page with hyperlinked publications and data-
bases at http://www.soa.org/research/health/research-
medical-large-claims-experience-study.aspx.
24 The model reflects the 2006 findings of the WSPS from 
the Office of Financial Management; see http://www.
ofm.wa.gov/sps/default.asp. WSPS staff provided survey 
output in the format appropriate to feed into construc-
tion of the model’s baseline dataset. The model’s baseline 
microdata do not match the WSPS exactly because the 
simulation methodology requires benchmarking to many 
other important distributions as well, such as the distribu-
tion of employment by firm size. 
25 Data on businesses come from the federal survey Statistics 
of United States Business (SUSB) for 2004, Accessible at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/introusb.htm.
26 Our approach counted claims-handling expenses as part 
of insurance loading; other approaches to loading may 
count them as part of benefits cost.
27 This federal survey is also part of MEPS, but the 
Insurance Component, or MEPS-IC, rather than the 
Household Component described above.
28 The Rhode Island Health Care Affordability Act of 2006, 
Ch. 258 enacted July 3, 2006. http://www.rilin.state.
ri.us/PublicLaws/Law06/law06258.htm, accessed Feb 
18, 2008. Many other relevant materials are posted at 
Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner of Rhode 
Island, “HEALHPact RI,” http://www.ohic.ri.gov/
HealthPactPlans.php, accessed Feb 18 2008. The program 
was renamed HealthPact RI in May 2007.
29 See, for example, Department of Human Services State 
of Rhode Island, “Rhode Island Pilot Project Planning 
Grant: Interim Report to U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services,” Health Resources and Services 
Administration, State Planning Grant No.1 P09 OA 
01678-01-00, September 2006, http://www.statecover-
age.net/hrsa/winter06/rhodeisland_annual.pdf; Plan 
Design Comparison: Medicaid, Commercial plan designs, 
December 4, 2006 [unpublished internal document]; 
Hinckley, Allen & Tringale, LP, and DeWeese Consulting, 
Inc. The Effectiveness of the Small Employer Health 
Insurance Availability Act in Promoting Rate Stability, 
Product Availability, and Coverage Affordability, Report 
to Health Insurance Commissioner, December 2006, 
http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/health-
insurance/070419%20small%20group%20Policy%20
Report%20Final.pdf.
30 Details appear in Masi, P., et al. “Summary of Reinsurance 
Institute Work with Rhode Island and Final Modeling 
Results,” Memorandum to Office of the Health Insurance 
Commissioner, November 28, 2007.
31 See “Pooling Risk, Reducing Cost” Web page of 
Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner 
(OIC), updated March 2005, http://www.insurance.
wa.gov/legislative/factsheets/pooling_risk.shtml, accessed 
January 8, 2008; Watts, C., et al. Pooling and Reinsurance 
in Washington State Health Insurance Markets: Review 
of the OIC Proposal, report of February 25, 2005, 
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/legislative/reports/
CommonwealthPRCCreport.pdf.
32 Barclay, T.S. Milliman, letters of analysis to Washington 
State Health Care Authority on Healthy Washington pro-
posal June 22 and August 2, 2006.
33 See Bovbjerg, R. “Public Reinsurance and Technical 
Assistance to Washington State from the SCI Reinsurance 
Institute,” draft of January 26, 2007, and Washington 
Office of Financial Management and Office of the 
Insurance Commissioner, “Reinsurance Institute: 
Washington State’s Participation,” February 2007 (a 
March 2007 revision was included as an appendix in 
Chollet, D. The Affordability of Coverage for High-Cost 
Individuals: Options for Washington State, April 30, 2007, 
www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/health/2118-Report_
Reinsurance5.pdf. 
34 Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and 
Access, Final Report, January 2007. Available at http://
www.governor.wa.gov/priorities/healthcare/BlueRibbon_
FinalReport.pdf. This called for an assessment of replac-
ing the state’s non-group high-risk pool with a form of 
reinsurance.
35 Chollet, D. 2007, above note 33. Reinsurance Institute 
staff Bovbjerg and Ideman reviewed a draft of this report 
and made suggestions for revision to OIC.
36 House Bill 1569 (reinsurance under new Health Insurance 
Partnership) and Senate Bill 5930 (study and recommen-
dation called for), 60th Legislature, 2007 Regular Session.
37 Much of this policy history is accessible at Department 
of Health & Family Services, “Healthy Wisconsin,” 
http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/HealthyWisconsin/ accessed 
February 18, 2008.
38 This amount was noted in Health Wisconsin Council 
Report: Reducing Wisconsin’s Uninsured Rate and 
Lowering Health Care Costs for Businesses and Families, 
January 9, 2007, at p. 6, accessible from DHFS Web page, 
op cit. Above note 37.
39 Office of the Governor Jim Doyle, “2006 State of the 
State Address: An Affordability Agenda for Middle-
Class and Working Families,” January 17, 2006, 
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.
asp?locid=19&prid=1648, accessed December 8, 2007.
40 For our estimations, small firms were those with 2 
through 49 employees; data limitations made it infeasible 
to follow the insurance regulatory definition of 2-50 
employees. Based upon the distribution of firms and 
employees by firm size, we estimate that only a few thou-
sand people work in firms of exactly 50 employees and 
are therefore unrepresented in our data on small firms—a 
very small fraction of the total. No simple correction is 
possible, as characteristics of these people are unknown. 
41 See Garrett, A.B., et al. above note 21.
42 Estimates are for a standardized package of benefits, 
which serves to make spending comparable across the pri-
vately insured populations; these figures include enrollees’ 
out-of-pocket spending.
43 Berk, M.L., and A.C. Monheit. “The Concentration 
of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited,” Health 
Affairs 20(2):9-18, 2001. Blumberg, L., and J. Holahan. 
“Government as Reinsurer: Potential Impacts on Public 
and Private Spending,” Inquiry 41(2):130–43, Summer 
2004.
44 Exhibit 5 shows a somewhat uneven pattern of decline in 
estimated shares of spending incurred within successively 
higher corridors of per-person annual spending. Larger 
samples result in smoother patterns of decline. It should 
also be noted that the exact shape of this distribution 
varies somewhat by segment of the insured population 
examined.
45 Their higher out of pocket spending might reflect that 
less healthy people can only afford less rich benefits or 
that insurance benefit design better matches consumption 
preferences of the majority of enrollees, who are healthier.
46  Findings were reported to the state in Masi, P., et al. 
Memo to Rhode Island, op cit. Above note 29. 
47 This set of simulations was done under the SCI grant 
that supported the Reinsurance Institute project. Findings 
were reported to the state in Clemans-Cope, L., et al. 
Washington December Memo, op cit.
48 This finding of non-group variation in response by 
income is consistent with Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, “How Non-Group Health Coverage Varies 
With Income,” No. 7737, February 2008, http://www.kff.
org/insurance/upload/7737.pdf.
49 This set of simulations was done under a Washington 
contract. Findings were reported to the state in Bovbjerg, 
R., et al. “Reinsurance in Washington State,” Report to 
the Washington Office of Financial Management and 
Office of the Insurance Commissioner, February 2008. 
That report’s executive summary closely resembles this 
section of this report.
50 The rationale is that it would be inconsistent with 
excluding AHPs from reinsurance subsidy to allow AHP 
households to selectively enroll some family members in 
reinsurance-subsidized non-group coverage.
51 For detail, see Bovbjerg, R., et al. Reinsurance in 
Washington, 2008. op. cit. Above note 49.
52 Findings were reported to the state in Garrett, A.B., 
et al. “Summary of Reinsurance Institute Work with 
Wisconsin and Final Modeling Results,” Memorandum to 
Department of Health and Family Services, December 26, 
2007.
16
Reinsurance in State Health Reform
53 For example, it had not yet been made clear whether all 
ages were meant to be included, nor whether bankruptcy 
protection meant something different for insured and 
uninsured people or for people of different levels of 
income and assets. Data were also lacking on assets and 
other factors that influence bankruptcy.
54 We also appreciate that not all coverage provided to small 
firms is always subject to small group rating rules; this 
was most clearly the case in Washington. Association and 
franchise coverages may be exceptions, and rules may 
have differing effects where applied separately within each 
book of business maintained by an insurer. Again, overall 
our pricing matches what is reported by buyers within 
each state, just not within every insurance category that 
may exist in a state.
55 Bovbjerg, R. and K. Ideman. Memorandum on Draft 
Report, to Office of the Insurance Commissioner, 
Washington State, April 13, 2007.
56 These issues were discussed in a cyber seminar with 
state officials hosted by State Coverage Initiatives, “Risk 
Premium in Private Insurance Rates,” http://statecover-
age.net/cyberseminar1206.htm. Primary insurers, especial-
ly smaller firms, are risk averse, which is shown when they 
voluntarily buy private reinsurance, paying substantially 
more than the cost of high-end claims that they transfer 
to the reinsurer—to cover the reinsurer’s administrative 
loading and profit margin. 
 
 Public reinsurance might also achieve a savings for pri-
mary insurers if it makes private reinsurance unnecessary. 
To do so, however, the public reinsurance would have to 
have two features not present in Healthy NY or any of 
the plans modeled for this project’s participating states: 
(a) very high ceilings of reinsured medical claims, possibly 
to the policy limits of coverage and (b) protection against 
high aggregate losses from an accumulation of high-per-
person spending. 
57 Evidence appears to be limited. See estimates made by 
Hay/Huggins (now Hay Group) for House Committee 
on Education & Labor. “Costs and Effects of Extending 
Insurance Coverage,” Committee Print 100-EE, 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
October 1988, discussed in Williams, C. and J. Lee. “Are 
Health Insurance Premiums Higher for Small Firms?” 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Policy Brief No. 2, 
September 2002, http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/
reports_and_briefs/pdf/no2_policybrief.pdf. 
58 The initial premium estimate was made by Actuarial 
Research Corporation and assumed a standard-risk 
enrollee population for Healthy NY (ARC, personal 
communication); data in the box come from Chu, R. 
and S. Van Tassell. Report on the Healthy NY Program 
2006, prepared for the State of New York Insurance 
Department. Washington, DC: EP&P Consulting, Inc., 
January 2007, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/hny/
reports/hnyepp2006.pdf.
59 Long. S.H. and M.S. Marquis. “Trends in Offering 
Employer-Sponsored Coverage,” Data Bulletin No. 15, 
Center for Studying Health System Change, Fall 1998, 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/47/.
60 This section draws upon prior writing, e.g., Bovbjerg, R. 
“Reinsurance ... in Missouri,” 2006. op cit. Above note 22, 
as well as the experience of Pool Administrators, Inc., in 
operating reinsurance pools for states under prior small 
group market reforms.
61 Swolak, P. “Healthy NY: How Does the Program Work 
and Why Does It Work?” Presentation to SCI meeting, 
September 12, 2006, http://www.statecoverage.net/kick-
offmeeting.htm.
62 In insurance and finance this phenomenon is called 
“moral hazard.” Only in extreme cases, however, is such 
behavior immoral, as where fraudulent claims are submit-
ted to obtain higher reimbursement. Typically, spending 
more where spending is subsidized is merely a normal and 
predictable response to a fiscal incentive. One goal of pri-
mary insurance is to enable insured people to spend more 
on health services; that is one reason that insured people 
have better health and live longer than the uninsured. 
Reinsurance, however, is not meant to increase spending 
by primary insurers.
63 See, for example, Washington Office of the Insurance 
Commissioner. “Pooling Risk, Reducing Cost,” 2005, 
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/legislative/factsheets/
pooling_risk.shtml; Swartz, K. Reinsuring Health: Why More 
Middle-Class People Are Uninsured and What Government Can 
Do. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 
2006; Chollet, D. “The Role of Reinsurance in State 
Efforts to Expand Coverage,” State Coverage Initiatives, 
Issue Brief, AcademyHealth 5.4, 2004, www.statecoverage.
net/pdf/issuebrief1004.pdf.
64 Garfinkel, I. and R. Haveman. “Earnings Capacity and 
the Target Efficiency of Alternative Transfer Programs,” 
American Economic Review, 64(2):196-204, 1974, http://
www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950137/95p0075z/0. 
Blumberg, L.J. “Balancing Efficiency and Equity in the 
Design of Coverage Expansions for Children,” The 
Future of Children, 13(1):205-211,  http://www.future-
ofchildren.org/usr_doc/tfoc13-1n.pdf.
65 Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner, State 
of Rhode Island. “Small Business Health Insurance & 
Prospects for Reform,” Presentation to Joint Health 
Care Oversight Committee, February 27, 2006, http://
www.dbr.ri.gov/documents/divisions/healthinsur-
ance/HI-legupdateFe06_27_final_060228.ppt, accessed 
February 8, 2008; see also U.S. General Accounting 
Office [now Government Accountability Office], “Private 
Health Insurance: Small Employers Continue to Face 
Challenges in Providing Coverage,” Washington, DC: 
GAO, GAO-02-8, October 2001.
66  Actuarial Research Corporation. “Study of the 
Administrative Costs and Actuarial Values of Small Health 
Plans,” report to the SBA Office of Advocacy, January 
2003, http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs224tot.pdf, 
accessed February 8, 2008.
67 The configuration was 90 percent reinsurance reimburse-
ment of per-person annual insured costs of $10,000 to 
$90,000 for all small-firm and non-group coverages. See 
Bovbjerg, R., et al. Reinsurance in Washington, 2008. op. 
cit. Above note 49, exhibits 11 and 16.
68 Freudenheim, M.  “Small Businesses’ Premiums Soar 
After Illness,” New York Times, May 5, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/05/05/business/05insure.html.
69 Freudenheim, M. “Small Businesses’ Premiums Soar 
After Illness,” New York Times, May 5, 2007; “Healthy 
Wisconsin” final report at p. 12, see note 38 above.
70 Zellers, W.K., C.G. McLaughlin, and K.D. Frick. “Small-
Business Health Insurance: Only The Healthy Need 
Apply,” Health Affairs, 11(1):174-80, 1992; Merlis, M. 
Fundamentals of Underwriting in the Non-group Health 
Insurance Market: Access to Coverage and Options for 
Reform, Washington DC: National Health Policy Forum, 
NHPF Background Paper, April 13, 2005, http://nhpf.
ags.com/pdfs_bp/BP_Underwriting_04-13-05.pdf. 
71 Risk segmentation is a very broad topic, and retrospective 
reinsurance like Healthy NY is only one alternative for 
addressing it. As noted in Bovbjerg, R. et al. Reinsurance 
in Washington, 2008. op. cit. [above note 49], more 
extensive analysis of selection needs to investigate other 
mechanisms with similar goals: more regulatory support 
for forms of open enrollment and modified community 
rating, risk-adjustment of subsidies for primary premiums, 
ceding of identified high risk people or groups in advance 
(prospective reinsurance), and withholds from premiums 
as paid to be distributed at the end of the year according 
to the risks actually enrolled by competing plans. All of 
these mechanisms call for substantial managerial informa-
tion and control over funding flows and may or may not 
be feasible outside of a large employment group or absent 
full systems reform for all of health coverage. Chollet, D. 
2007, op. cit. [above note 33], also noted many of these 
interventions related to risk segmentation and differential 
premiums, also without drawing firm conclusions.
72 Washington had enrollment counts from regular state 
reporting. Rhode Island had more detail because it had just 
done a market conduct examination. See Hinckley, Allen 
& Tringale and DeWeese Consulting, The Effectiveness 
of the Small Employer Health Insurance Availability Act 
in Promoting Rate Stability, Product Availability, and 
Coverage Affordability, report to the Health Insurance 
Commissioner and associated insurer reports, December 
2006, www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/health-
insurance/070419%20small%20group%20Policy%20
Report%20Final.pdf, accessed November 28, 2007.
17

